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Abstract
Rural elderly have 40% of the income of those in urban areas,  spend a larger share of their
income on food, are in worse health, work later into their lives, and depend more on their children, lacking
pensions and public services.  The birth quota since 1980 has particularly restricted the childbearing of
rural less educated women, who now face retirement with fewer children for support. Inequality in China
is also be traced to increasing returns to schooling , especially beyond secondary school.  Government
restrictions on rural-urban migration reduces national efficiency, adds to the urban-rural wage gap, and
increases inequality.  
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1.  Introduction
Chinese economic growth since the mid 1970s is impressive by world standards (Maddison 1998;
Johnson, 1990).  My objective is to examine the policies and institutions that may have fostered or
inhibited that growth, related to the efficient and equitable  production and utilization of human resources. 
This will involve first a consideration of China’s population policies, which have taken a unique form in
response to this century’s opportunities to improve health. The second issue involves social and private
investments in reproducible human capital, or investments in the capacities of the Chinese populations to
be productive during their increasingly long, healthier lives. The individual, family, and society requires
information on how large the private and social returns are to investments in schooling, health,  labor
mobility, and on-the-job training, and the state should assess how it can help local communities and
families invest in the highest return activities available to them, while dismantling restrictions on individual
behavior which restrict people from realizing these returns.  
In addition to efficiency achieved by promoting the formation of human capital that promise to
earn the highest return on private and public resources, and thus advance individual incomes as well as
aggregate economic growth, society also values less inequality in the distribution of national income.
Inequalities are basically of two types: those which serve an allocative function to achieve a higher rate of
economic growth, and those that do not facilitate more rapid growth.  Sources of inequality which are not
associated with incentives and institutions promoting growth should be evaluated and if possible eliminated
or counterbalanced by targeted remedies.  It may be desirable to go still further and sacrifice some
growth in order to reduce current and accumulating  inequalities, by such measures as progressive
personal taxation and welfare transfer schemes which are designed to minimize disincentive on effort and
growth.  In these instances the tradeoffs between growth and equality should be clarified to assure that
these complex choices are well informed, openly debated, and transparently implemented.3
I will present evidence that the returns to human capital have become larger in Chinese
agriculture after 1979, as the rural organizational reforms spread throughout the country, and are today
more broadly reflected in the structure of wages received in the rural (Township-Village-Enterprises:
TVE) industries. Returns to schooling are also increasingly evident in the expanding urban economy. 
These growing returns to human capital add to inequality, but also promise to improve the allocation of
labor, promote innovation, and encourage families and communities to sacrifice current resources to invest
in the formation of larger supplies of valuable human skills for the future.  Similarly, interregional
differences in wages are large in China, signaling  returns to migration are substantial.  However, if labor
mobility is restricted by government regulations and channeled into short-term migration, which causes a
reduction in complementary investments in on-the-job training and schooling in rural areas, these may be
costly market failures.  Recently, there are tentative signs that the new Chinese government may relax its
limits on rural-urban migration and assign a higher priority to alleviating poverty in the rural interior areas
of China.  But initiatives in these areas will be undertaken with the hopes of not raising urban
unemployment in the old industrial cities where state firms need to trim employment.  Other sources of
inequality which do not improve the allocation of resources should be reassessed. The development of
new institutions and social arrangements may be needed to address some of these inequalities and provide
individuals, firms, and government  with opportunities and incentives to improve the allocation of
resources. 
This paper is divided into three more sections. Section two deals with population growth,  the
Chinese response of a “birth quota”, and its implications for efficiency and equity.  Section three considers
empirical evidence of returns to education and other wage differentials in and between rural and urban
labor markets.  Section four briefly concludes by identifying problems and  priorities that could help China
realize its ambitions for growth and diminished inequalities.4
2.  Population Growth, Economic Development, and Birth Quotas
The reduction in age-specific mortality in China after the end of the Second World War and
subsequent Civil War was exceptionally rapid, particularly among infants and young children, and it  is
plausibly attributed in part to an egalitarian distribution of available food and widespread control and
treatment of infectious disease (Prescott and Jamison, 1985).  Life expectancy at birth increased in China
from about 38 years in 1950, to 64 years in 1978, marred  by the politically exacerbated famine of 1959-
1961 (Johnson, 1998), and then continued to grow to 69 years by 1995.  This nearly doubling of the
duration of life is a remarkable achievement for a country with China’s level of income (Maddison, 1989;
Table 3.6). As a direct consequence of this success in improving health, the annual rate of population
growth of China, which was about 1.3 percent per year in the period 1945 to 1955,  increased to 3.2
percent per year between 1965 and 1970 (Maddison, 1998; Table D-1). 
 Political indecisiveness as to how a socialist state should react to this increase in the rate of
population growth ended in 1979, when China announced it’s one-child family policy.  The one-child policy
was relaxed in 1984  in Document No.7 of the Central Government, in which rural couples whose first
child was a girl were allowed to have a second birth in most parts of China. Indeed, in six provinces of
Guangdong, Hainan, Yunnan, Ningxia, and Xingjian, all rural couples were officially allowed to have two
children (Schultz and Zeng, 1999).  The modest rise in birth rates in 1985-87 is associated with the
concurrent liberalization in the marriage laws that led to more first births among younger women, rather
than an increase in births of a higher birth order, as might be expected if the rise in fertility were due to a
relaxation of family size quotas.  Although many low-income countries in addition to China have
experienced a decline in their total fertility rates from 6  children per woman to 2 or 3 children in a period
of two or three decades,  no other country has adopted China’s solution of imposing quotas on births.
What is the economic rationale for a state to curb population growth by means of quantitative restrictions
on fertility ? 5
 There is little consensus on the causal forces which improved world health conditions and
reduced mortality, and what combination of factors subsequently reduced fertility and slowed  population
growth rates.  When a panel of economists and demographers examined the argument that rapid
population growth was a deterrent to growth in per capita income, they could not find scientific support
for this widely held belief (National Academy of Sciences, 1986).   The arguments linking population
growth to slower growth in per capita income are systematically reexamined and rejected by D. Gale
Johnson (1999) several years ago. There is little empirical support for the hypothesis that increases in
child survival are associated with decreases in savings or investment rates, as assumed by Coale and
Hoover (1958) in their early demographic economic simulations for India.  Some East Asian countries did
subsequently increase their household savings rates while fertility declined in the 1960s and 1970s
(Higgins and Williamson, 1987).  Other regions, however, such as Latin America, experienced
comparable declines in total fertility but experienced  no major increase in savings or economic growth.
There are correlations across countries in some regions, and in some time periods, between changes in
age structure of the population and more rapid growth in per capita income.  These inter-country
associations might be explained by the fact that a growing share of the population in countries that reduce
their fertility are in age groups who participate most frequently in the labor force. In addition, with a 
reduction in fertility the proportion of women’s adult lifetime allocated to working outside of the home
tends to increase as they allocate less time to child care, adding further to growth in labor force.  The
country-level correlations between the age composition and its income growth could be due to these or
other omitted factors, such as women’s increasing education relative to men’s (Schultz, 1994). It is hard
to discriminate among these mechanisms, but as Johnson (1999) articulated with specific reference to
China – moderate rates of population growth, between 2 to 0 percent per year, have not been causally
linked to slower (or more rapid) rates of economic growth.  Even in a country that is as densely populated
and poor as China was in the 1980s, there appears to be no scientific basis for encouraging lower fertility
or slower population growth in order to promote economic development.6
What other reasons might the state invoke to justify a population policy?  There is an argument
for providing family planning information and services to private citizens to help them have the number of
births they want and time those births optimally over an individual’s life cycle. Given the rate of
improvement in child survival in many low-income countries, new generations of parents confront very
different lifetime opportunities.  The most promising options for their lives, and those of their children, may
change with the extension of information about new technologies.   To assess the reliability and risks
associated with different modern birth control technologies, a public health extension service can usefully
diffuse information. In the case of agriculture, where family farms are small, the government has an
economic justification for subsidizing the production of new (agricultural) technology and the diffusion of
best practices at low marginal cost through farm extension services.  For parallel reasons, there is a
justification for governments to subsidize the diffusion of best practices in the area of family planning. 
However, going further and setting a birth quotas is an unprecedented policy, which is not now justified by
a consensus of economic or demographic research. 
There are instances where the state is already subsidizing children, and may wish to modify  this
policy.  However, it would not seem prudent to extend this logic to recouping the entire public costs of
providing children with health care and education, for most of the returns to human capital are realized by
the children, or in other words, the next generation in the society.  Most evidence suggests these human
capital investments have high social as well as private returns. Societies have traditionally viewed health
and educational investments in children as public goods, which are encouraged for all social and economic
classes if the social returns are high.  The mechanism providing encouragement is also designed, where
possible, to reduce the inequality in health and schooling within a birth cohort. 
One possibly reason for the Chinese government to adopted a birth quota was to compensate for
the government’s failure to initiate a  voluntary family planning program in the 1960s and 1970s, when
many other East Asian countries were extending family planning services through the public sector. 
However, this quota policy is not likely to impose the same cost on all people.  It is not easy to determine7
whose fertility is “capped” by the quota policy and whose is least affected by this policy.  The private
costs of the birth quota are paid, in terms of welfare losses,  by those who would find it in their own
private interests to have more than the allowed number of children.  Viewed thus as a tax on the
population, the burden of this tax is proportionately regressive, imposing higher opportunity costs on the
rural poor relative to their incomes, than on the urban rich relative to their incomes. Also, since the
penalties for a birth in excess of the quota (out of plan) are generally set in fixed monetary terms by local
governments, this “fixed price” for an “out of plan” birth will not discourage the rich from having an
additional child as much as it will the poor.  However, other penalties may be more progressive in their
impacts, such as loss of employment for the parents, loss of priority for public housing,  or failure to
register the child for public schooling, all of which could represent a larger financial penalty for the rich
than for the poor. Nonetheless, in rural areas where private demands for fertility are most likely to exceed
the quota, the principal penalty for self-employed farmers is probably the fixed fine, unless the farmer is
sufficiently poor and has no assets with which to pay the fine.
 It is hard to imagine how one could infer how people would behave ( i.e. their hypothetical
fertility) if the legal system they lived under did or did not restrict such behavior.  However, as a guide,
studies in various countries find regardless of whether voluntary family planning services are provided by
the public, better educated women who are able to earn a higher wage in the labor market tend to have
fewer children.  Economists are inclined to interpret this widespread relationship between female
education and reduced fertility as support for their hypothesis that fertility is partly determined by
economic rational motives  – and when the value of a mother’s time increases, the private opportunity
costs of having a child increases, and fertility tends to decline (Becker, 1981: Schultz and Zeng, 1995).  In
addition, a woman’s education tends to be related to her knowledge of birth control, and the time it takes
her to identify and adopt a beneficial technological innovation, such as a new form of birth control. Thus,
her education may reduce her cost of using effectively birth control and thereby reduce her unwanted
fertility.  A mother’s education may also reduce the amount of her time required to educate her children,8
and this would enhance her expected rate of return in investing in the education of her children, and lower
her reproductive goals (Schultz , 1997).
Many empirical analyses of reproductive behavior in low-income and high-income countries
confirm that parents behave as if  the number of children (quantity) they have is a substitute in their
consumption for the schooling and health (quality) investments they make in each of their children.  This
tradeoff of quality for quantity on the part of parents is linked by Becker and Lewis (1974) to the modern
demographic transition. Exploiting a natural experiment of “twins” as an unplanned or accidental extra
birth, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) show (in rural India in 1969-71) an “extra” twin is associated with a
woman having 0.8 more births at the time of the survey, which is consistent with birth control being
imperfect or costly, and some of the pregnancies that produced twins would otherwise have been the
woman’s last birth.  The substitution of child quantity for quality is then estimated by the cross-effect of
the occurrence of a twin on the schooling of the parents’ other children. The negative sign estimated for
this partial relationship between an uncontrolled change in the fertility supply on the demand for schooling
is indirect evidence that quantity and quality are viewed by parents as substitutes.   In the Chinese
context, these investigations suggest that the impact of a birth quota would be the opposite to that due to
twins, and could force Chinese parents to increase their income-compensated demand for education of
their remaining children, if their loss in income or utility associated with the imposition of the quota did not
dominate their net cross-substitution effect (Schultz, 1997). 
Others have analyzed the consequences of social experiments providing family planning services
to randomly selected villages in low-income countries to estimate first how much the random family
planning services helped the “treated” woman reduce her fertility, and second,  how much the exposure to
the family planning program treatment affects the schooling of the woman’s children.  Foster and Roy
(1992) concluded that in an experimental family planning program in rural Bangladesh started in
1977/1978,  the primary mechanism by which the family planning program effected educational attainment9
of the women’s children operates through a reduction in the number of pre-school children in the
household.   
Another characteristic of couples who voluntarily demand more children is that they work in a
situation where unskilled child labor has a greater productive value in the family, or the inputs to rearing
children are cheaper, or both.  Rural-agricultural households in low-income countries which tend to have a
range of chores that children can readily perform, such as herding livestock, often report greater fertility. 
In most parts of the world, holding constant for the mother’s and father’s education, those engaged in
agriculture tend to have larger families (Schultz, 1997). Conversely,  the high cost of adding to a family’s
housing in Chinese cities may deter most urban couples from wanting a second child.
If there were an economic reason to invest social resources to encourage lower fertility than
would prevail with only a voluntary family planning policy, what alternative programs or policies might
accomplish the same consequence as  the birth quota, and yet be less inequitable?  The schooling of girls
is still lagging behind that of boys in the poor rural interior areas of China (Knight and Shi, 1996).  A
subsidy for girls to attend school or for rural schools in poorer areas should have the effect of encouraging
parents to substitute the schooling of their children for having more children.  In other words, relying on
the symmetry of the quality-quantity income compensated substitution effect described earlier, a subsidy
for parents to invest more in their children’s schooling would effectively reduce fertility among poor rural
families (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980, 1982) and accomplish the effect of the birth quota on the quantity
and quality of children.   
A frequently mentioned reason for having more children in many traditional societies, such as
China,  is to have more boys for security and support of the parents in old age.  The government of China
has provided urban state employees with pensions, weakening urban demands for large families.  The
government prohibition of private land ownership strengthens the relative demands of rural parents for
more children, and for sons in particular.  The hypothesized motivation relies on a lack of alternative10
investment instruments which could substitute for children by transferring consumption over the life cycle
or permit parents to buy old age insurance (Zhang and Nishamura, 1993).  
 The unattractive distributional consequences of the birth quota in China is made worse by the
recent decentralization of government finances following in the wake of  the economic reforms.  Rural
women who might have been about 30 in 1980 and told to have no additional births will in 2003 be 54 and
approaching retirement without those extra children to support them and care for them.  If they lived in
the city they might receive locally provided health care and even a pension ( See later Table 1 and section
3.4).  In the rural sector, pensions are rare and medical services which were provided in many
communities through the collective farm have been terminated or privatized.  Welfare services at the
county and township level now rely primarily on local taxes, and with fiscal decentralization they are no
longer subsidized by the central government.  Taxes on local industry may also support welfare programs
for the elderly, but this tax base is disproportionately concentrated in the high-income coastal provinces
(West and Wong, 1995; Wong and Woo 1995).  If  China cannot yet afford a pension for its rural elderly,
the consequences of its birth quota will soon become even more salient as elderly rural women and men 
retire with few, if any, children to support them. 
3. Human Resource Investments and Returns
 China emphasized first universal primary and widespread secondary schooling, and more recently
expanded higher education. Data from UNESCO  and the China Statistical Yearbooks indicate primary
and secondary educational enrollment rates increased rapidly after 1949.  However, higher education
enrollments and specialized secondary education enrollments collapsed at the end of the 1960s during the
Cultural Revolution. To compare China with other countries, Maddison’s (1998) estimates  “primary
equivalent” years of education, which increased for China from 1.6 “equivalent years” in 1950,  to 4.1
years in 1973,  to 8.5 years in 1992.   Chinese educational attainment has increased marginally from
somewhat less than half the level of Korea and Taiwan in 1950,  to about 60 percent of these countries by11
1992.  The population of China had 1.2 times the educational attainment of India in 1950, according to
Maddison’s estimate, and this advantage widened to 1.8 times India’s education by 1992.  Many surveys
show growth of enrollments in the 1980s and 1990s, though dropout rates from secondary schools
continue to be substantial in rural areas, particularly among girls (West and Wong, 1995; Knight and Shi,
1996). 
 With the size and diversity of China, most studies of the labor market shed light on the levels of
and returns1 to human capital in only a few provinces, and then generally the samples are drawn only
from the urban or rural population.  It is unclear how representative these observed wage patterns are for
the entire nation.  Self-employed farmers represent most of the rural labor force today, making it is
difficult to measure the productivity of self employed family labor. Estimates of wage functions in rural
areas do not generally attempt to correct for the potential sample selection bias introduced by analyzing
only the small share of rural wage earners and excluding self employed and family workers.  For
example, Meng (1998) notes that the lack of wage returns to college graduates in her rural industry
survey is probably due to the fact that most college educated rural youth can qualify for an urban job, and
those who stay behind in rural industries are probably less motivated and less productive than those who
have migrated out of the rural sample.  These limitations of available evidence on the wage labor market
will not be resolved until nationally representative random samples of the labor force and population are
collected over time for all of China, and a reliable strategy is developed for dealing with the selectivity of
wage earning samples.
3.1 Rural Labor Market
Household surveys or censuses that include information on wages and worker characteristics,
including their human capital, are not widely available for China before the 1980s.   When these types of
data are available, they suggest education earns  a wage premium for Chinese workers, although the
percentage gains in wages per year of schooling completed by the worker are relatively modest for a12
country with China’s low educational attainment.  Differences in wages between men and women within
an education/age group are also relatively modest for a low-income country.  Is this a consequence of
China’s egalitarian institutions or a reflection of a relatively large supply of educated workers compared
with the derived demand of employers for educated workers?  In other words, will integrating the Chinese
labor market and allowing it to operate more competitively raise the returns for the educated worker, or is
the supply of educated workers currently adequate for the Chinese Economy?  
The agricultural reforms which ushered in the Household Responsibility System spread rapidly
across China from 1978 to 1982 (See figure 2, Schultz and Zeng, 1999), and were associated with
increased off-farm rural employment and gradually increasing rural-urban migration ( Johnson, 1990,
1994, 1999; deBraw, et al, 2002).  Farm management and production surveys have been used to estimate
agricultural production functions, from which the marginal product of labor can be inferred, but they do
not typically disaggregate labor inputs (by education, age, and sex) to allow one to infer the implicit wage
structure in agriculture.  One exception is Li and Zhang (1998) that contrasts how work points and wage
payments varied in collectivized production teams in Wugong village of Hebei province in 1977, and how
post-reform household incomes varied by the characteristics of the household’s workers in Sichuan
province in 1990. They find the production team did not assign a wage premium to educated labor,
although males, older workers, and married males do receive higher wages than do other workers. In
contrast, in 1990 agricultural households have higher farm incomes if the education of the head or the
average education of family workers is higher.  This finding suggests that human capital has a return to
Chinese farmers today, as it does in most other countries where such data have been analyzed (Schultz,
1988), and that the economic incentive for rural youth to acquire schooling has increased with the
introduction of the Household Responsibility System.  Other investigations of household production in
agriculture confirm agricultural incomes tend to be higher for the better educated farm families, providing
significant though modest returns to those who have invested their time and family resources in continued
schooling (Yang, 1997b).  13
Much of the return to schooling in rural areas is realized by better educated individuals migrating
to higher wage labor markets, which are often in urban areas (Schultz, 1988).  Restrictions on permanent
migration in China reduces the returns that rural youth can expect to realize through profitably moving to a
higher wage labor market.  The household registration system has thus curbed mobility and reduced the
incentives for the rural population to invest in more schooling, while it has raised the returns to schooling in
the urban areas where the rural born are unable to migrate and establish a permanent residence. 
Restrictions on rural-urban mobility in China  has  the effect of increasing the gap in educational
investment between rural and urban families (Knight and Shi, 1996), widening the wage gap between
rural and urban labor markets, and raising overall wage inequality by increasing the relatively high urban
wages for educated skilled labor.
Xin Meng (1998) analyzed the structure of wages in rural townships, villages, and privately-
owned enterprises in 1986 and 1987 in four counties with different degrees of industrialization and
ownership structures.  Daily wage functions are estimated separately for men and women in competitive
markets ( i.e. private market-oriented firms) and less competitive firms ( i.e. public state-controlled ).  In
the private firms wages are 3.9 percent higher for male workers with an additional year of schooling
(average is 8.9 years of education), and 3.2 percent higher for female workers (average 8.3 years of
education). In state firms, however, better educated rural workers do not receive systematically higher
wages, and even tenure in the job, which is associated with higher wages in private firms, is unrelated to
wages in state firms (Xin Meng, 1998).  It is assumed that the economic reforms have contributed to the
expansion of employment in the private market-oriented firms as the reforms have reduced growth in
employment in state firms (Khan et al., 1998).  With the passage of time, it may be expected, therefore,
for these shifts in sectoral composition of employment to increase the average wage returns to schooling
in the rural labor market of China.14
3.2 Urban Labor Markets
In the urban economy studies of the labor market have documented gradually increasing private
wage returns to education (Schultz, 2000). Byron and Manatoto (1990) estimate from a 1986 Nanjing
market research sample that wage returns are about 3.7 percent per year of schooling. Women receive
wages that are 9 percent less than men, holding constant for the workers’ schooling and post-schooling
years of experience. Based on a 1989/1991/1993  panel survey from the China Economic Health and
Nutrition Survey collected in 8 provinces, wage returns were significant, tending to be about 2 percent per
year of schooling for men and 4 percent for women, rising slightly over this four year period
(Subramaniam, 1997).  Women employed in urban areas in state enterprises receive lower wages than
they do in the private sector, controlling for schooling, experience and province, whereas returns to
schooling for both sexes tend to be larger in poorer provinces where average educational levels are lower. 
The gender wage gap is 15 percent after holding constant observed worker productive characteristics. 
The Survey of Income Distribution in 1995 conducted in 11 provinces reported somewhat larger returns to
schooling, and although women’s wages tended to be 15-20 percent lower than men’s, women’s
percentage wage returns to schooling are higher than men’s (Moktan and Subramaniam, 1998). 
The State Statistical Bureau’s urban household surveys from three provinces (Guangdong,
Sichuan, and Hunan) have been used to estimate the wage structures for 1986/87, two years at the start
of this survey, and seven years later in 1993/94 (Schultz and Yu, 1998a, Tables 2,4,5).  Based on wage
earners age 15 to 59, the increment to log earnings associated with an additional year of education is the
Mincer (1974) approximation for the private internal rate of return that a student and her family might
expect to earn on the investment of the student’s opportunity cost of time attending school,log wages
rather than working.  Women’s absolute level of wages in these three provinces was 17 percent below
men’s wage level in 1986, and 22 percent below men’s wage by 1994. The wage returns associated with
schooling are, again, consistently higher for women than for men, an empirical  regularity often observed
in countries where women have obtained  less schooling that men (Schultz, 1995).   The gender gap in15
wages, after controlling for the workers education and age, has also been growing in China, even though it
remains relatively modest by international standards, 5 to 20 percent (Moktan and Subramaniam, 1998). 
Wage returns appear precisely defined in these cross sectional samples, according to the ratio of the
schooling return coefficient divided by its standard error.  However, there is substantial year-to-year
variation in the point estimate of the  return to schooling, which probably reflects sampling variability, as
well as some actual year-to-year changes in wage structures. Returns tend to increase for men over this
eight year period from 3.5 to 5.8 percent, and for women from 5.4 to 8.4 percent, respectively. By the end
of the period, returns are higher in Hunan and Sichuan than in Guangdong.  Coastal regions experienced
the more rapid growth in wages, reflected by Guangdong in this study, but schooling returns tend to be
lower in this province, which has a greater supply of better educated workers than the other two
provinces.  In 1985 the wage level in Guangdong Province was 30% higher than those prevailing in the
other two provinces, and by 1995 this interprovincial wage gap had increased  to 70 percent, (Schultz and
Yu, 1988a), another indication of the increasing potential returns to migration, if it were not restricted by
the registration system.
The wage function can also be specified to allow  the logarithm of the monthly wage to differ by
each level of schooling as reported categorically in the survey.  This specification of the wage function
avoids the need to impose log-linearity in the effect of years of schooling on the wage or attribute the
number of  years completed to those who do not finish a specific level of schooling (Schultz and Yu,
1998a, Tables A-7).  Workers with a junior middle school level of education received wages that were not
significantly higher than those with a primary or less education, and these wage returns to junior middle
school do not appear to grow systematically from 1986 to 1994.  Male workers  with a senior middle
school education receive a 15 percent wage advantage over the primary educated, and women receive a
25-35 percent wage premium, respectively.  For urban workers who have some college education, their
wage premium over the primary educated is large and growing, for men from 30 percent to 51 percent in
1986 to 1994, and for women from 52 to 83 percent in the same years. If  it requires four years of16
enrollment to advance from senior middle school to the college and more, the estimated wage gain for
women was about 11 percent per year enrolled by 1994, and these college returns were only 5.8 percent
in 1986, or half as large.  For men the comparable college returns also doubled in these eight years, from
4.5 to 9.3 percent per year enrolled.
These estimates of the returns to school level have been corrected for the possible bias
introduced by the systematic selection of persons into the urban wage labor force.   To correct for the
selectivity of the sample of wage earners, correction must be made for who enters the wage labor force
and who does not, i.e. variables identify the selection model which are assumed do not affect the wage a
worker might expect to receive in the wage labor force (Schultz, 1995).  In these data the most
appropriate variables that might raise the individual’s marginal utility in nonwage work are indicators of
wealth: property rights in the residence, gift income, income from sale of assets, and other unearned
income.  These variables suggest that those who are especially inclined to work in the wage labor force
because they lack these nonearned incomes are also more likely to receive for unobserved reasons lower
wages when they do work for wages.  However, this systematic selection of wage earners does not
impart a noticeable bias to the estimated rates of return to schooling (Schultz and Yu, 1998a).
The level of real wages, adjusted for changes in the consumer price index, appears to have grown
about 37 percent for men in this 8 year period and by 29 percent for women.  More notable is the
increase in the variance of the logarithms of monthly earnings, which is a commonly cited, if volatile, 
measure of the inequality of earnings.   The variance of log wages for men was .18 in 1986 or relatively
low, and had reached the level of .64 by 1994, whereas for women workers the increase in variance of
log wages was from .23 to .82 in the same time period.  In addition to the nearly doubling of the relative
wage return of education, there has been a  larger increase in the residual variance that is not explained
by the conventional indicators of skills, education, and post-schooling experience (Schultz and Yu, 1989a).
Gustafasson and Li (1998, 2000) have also analyzed Urban Household Income Surveys collected
by the Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences based on a SSB urban sample17
for ten provinces for 1988 and 1995.2  They report log monthly wage functions by sex, but they include
control variables for characteristics of jobs for which education and age might qualify an individual, such
as occupation, type of job in terms of supervisory authority, industry, temporary worker, and type of
ownership of the firm.  Consequently, the partial correlations they report with age and education are
difficult to compare with other studies, because they are estimated after conditioning on many
characteristics of the skill requirements of the job.   They report that wage differentials associated with
education tend to widen from 1988 to 1995, and percentage wage differentials in wages by education are
larger for women than for men.  The unadjusted difference in wages between men and women increases
from 17 to 22 percent.  For the four-year college graduate male wages were about 10 percent higher than
a middle school graduate in 1988, suggesting a 2.5 percent return per year of school attended.  This
adjusted wage differential had grown to 15 percent seven years later, implying a return per year of
college education of 3.8 percent, after controlling for the noted job characteristics.  For women, college
educated workers earned 10 percent more in 1988, and 21 percent more in 1995, conditional on job
characteristics.  The average wage of women is about 25 percent less than that of men with only a
primary level of education, but is 9 to 11 percent less than men with 2 years of college.  In other words,
the percentage earnings returns to education are also larger for women than for men after conditioning on
a variety of job characteristics.. 
Gustafasson and Li (1988) find that wage levels are 30-40 percent higher for workers in  foreign
and joint venture firms than in collective enterprises, which are only slightly below other public enterprises,
and wages are 15-30 percent higher in state firms than in collective and public enterprises.   The share of
temporary workers in the urban labor force is increasing from one percent in 1988 to nearly 3 percent in
1995, and the share is larger for females than males.  In 1988, male temporary workers received .24 log
points less than permanent workers (27 percent) holding other factors constant, whereas female
temporary worker received .48 log points less than permanent workers (62 percent).  Negative wage
differentials of these temporary workers declined by half over this seven year period,  to .14 and .22 log18
points by 1995, for men and women respectively.  This indicates the temporary/permanent worker
markets are becoming less segmented over time as the share of temporary workers in urban areas has
increased.  As other urban surveys confirm, the level of real wages increased from 1988 to 1995, by 47
percent in this sample, while inequality in monthly wages, measured in this study by the Gini coefficient
(scaled x100) , increased by 24 percent, from 23.3 to 28.9. (Gustafsson and Li, 1998).  
The most recent estimates of urban wage returns to years of schooling are reported by Zhang
and Zhao (2002) from the State Statistical Bureau’s urban sample of six cities and provinces (i.e. Beijing,
Liaoning, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Guangdong, and Shaanxi), based on real monthly earnings for employees age
16 to 60, separately in each year from 1988 to 1999.  Estimating Mincer’s (1974) specification of the log
earnings equation which controls only for a quadratic in post-schooling experience and city or province,
the coefficient on years of schooling increases from 3.2 to 9.2 percent for males from 1988 to 1999, and
from 6.1 to 15.0 percent for females (Zhang and Zhao, 2002, Table 8).  They find the return to schooling
is relatively stable at the junior high school over primary school levels, but increases at more advanced
levels of education, especially in the 1990s at technical and college levels.  The urban wage returns to
schooling increased more among cohorts born more recently, confirming the growing economic scarcity
of better educated younger workers trained in the period since the Cultural Revolution.  Across the six
regions, those provinces with a larger proportion (supply) of  better educated workers record lower
returns to schooling. The changing composition of urban jobs by type of employment is also reported from
1988 to 1999, showing the contraction of collectively owned enterprises from 24 to 14 percent of the
employment, a later slower contraction in employment by state units after 1995 from 79 to 74 percent, and
the sharp increase in the share employed by “other ownership enterprises” (e.g. private, foreign funded,
share-holding enterprises, and self-employed) from 1.2 to 11 percent, occurring mostly after 1991 (Zhang
and Zhao, 2002, Table 3).
In sum, recent urban labor market studies of China consistently report several regularities in wage
structures.  Regional wage differences are growing wider, wage returns to schooling above the junior19
secondary school level are increasing, and returns to age or post-school experience appear in the cross-
section to be diminishing or the young are gaining ground.  These empirical regularities are noted in many
countries moving from centrally-planned to market-oriented economies (Schultz, 2000).  More distinctive
to China at the start of the reform is the low level of returns to schooling and the relatively small (5-15
percent) gender wage gap, controlling for education and experience.  The gender wage gap has increased
more recently and the wage returns to obtaining more schooling remain consistently higher for women
than for men in the urban Chinese labor market.
3.3 Rural-Urban Wage Differentials and Migration
The gap in wage levels between urban and rural areas of China has been estimated as 2.4 to 1.0
(Griffin and Zhao, 1993; Rozelle, 1994), which is larger than observed in most low-income countries at an
early stage in their development.   Although the urban-rural wage gap may have declined somewhat in
China in the 1980s after the agricultural reforms when the price of agricultural output increased, the
urban-rural wage gap has probably widened again in the 1990s (Jian et al , 1996).  This large difference
between urban and rural incomes in China contrasts with the egalitarian doctrine justifying the early land
reform and collectivization of agriculture.  Part of this gap can be attributed to different levels of human
capital and skills in the two sectors, and to the vast size of China and the high transportation costs. 
However,  an urban bias in labor market policy has restrained rural to urban migration and other forms of
intersectoral adjustment.   Collectivized agricultural institutions provided weak incentives to allocate time
and effort efficiently at the individual level, contributing to the stagnation in agricultural output in the 1970s
(Johnson, 1990).  Government controls to curb rural-urban migration have been relaxed with the
agricultural reforms starting in 1979, allowing first for intra-rural migration to township-village-industries
which fueled growth in rural nonagricultural employment.  Urban consumer food subsidies (i.e., food
rations) for legal residents have become less effective in halting migration to the cities as a larger share of
food moves through free markets.  There are still a series of arrangements registering households20
(Houkou) that restrain the efficient adjustment of intersectoral labor markets, and these are probably the
most costly distortion in the Chinese economy today.   
Family migration from the countryside to the city is costly because there is only a thin private
market in urban housing, with most housing provided by an employer as in-kind source of income linked to
a job.   Rural immigrants with sufficient education may be able to locate a good urban job and satisfy the
regulations to move, but for the less educated in rural areas, the only way to migrate may be as part of a
contract labor group, or classified as a temporary worker.  Single persons are then used for physical labor
and neither the employer nor the worker has an economic incentive for the worker to learn additional
skills or gain on-the-job training to qualify for a better job.  The temporary and seasonal migrant cannot
expect to accumulate the relevant skills which a permanent migrant would acquire to advance his career
in the urban sector.  Thus, the legal barriers to permanent migration contributes to an under-investment in
on-the-job training among illegal and temporary migrants to Chinese cities.  
A major factor underlying the urban-rural wage gap is the difference in years and quality of
education of urban and rural workers.  Knight and Shi (1996) examine the 1988 national household sample
survey3  and report that rural residents have 4.6 fewer years of schooling than urban residents.  With a 5
percent return on schooling as noted earlier, this gap in education could explain directly only about a 25
percentage points of the sectoral difference in wage rates.   Differences in nutrition and health could also
be an important factor, for even with the egalitarian health and food-sharing institutions of China, there
are still large differences in child  height and weight standardized for the child’s age which suggest
widespread rural malnutrition in the interior provinces that are likely to stunt adult physical growth and
contribute to the early development of chronic illnesses, which reduce individual productivity (Shen, et al.
1996) . In a sample of seven provinces rural-urban differences in child physical growth and development
diminished somewhat after the rural reforms, from 1975 to 1985, but grew larger from 1987 to 1992
(Shen.et al.1996). It is often hypothesized that child nutritional status complements investments in21
schooling, and it has been reported that malnourished school children perform less adequately in schools in
China (Jamison, 1986) and elsewhere (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1995).  
The long-term improvements in health that occur with economic development are closely
associated with the growth in average adult health and height (Fogel, 1994; Schultz and Tansel, 1997).  In
an analysis of the China Health and Nutrition Survey, Yan (1999) observed an increase in adult height of
about .15 centimeter per year from 1945 to 1960, but much slower growth in height after the recovery
from the famine of 1959-61.4   The variance in adult height in China may have increased over time,
providing another potential factor contributing to the rural-urban wage gap.  The socially predictable
variation in height can be interpreted as a form of health human capital, and an additional centimeter of
predicted adult height is associated with a five to ten percent increment in wages (Schultz, 1999, 2002).   
The household responsibility system, which replaced the collectives in agriculture during the years
1979 to 1983,  left the farmer with an allotment of land and an obligation, at least initially, to sell a
specified amount of agricultural output to the state at fixed prices. The land allotment is subject to
reallocation periodically by local government authorities.  Johnson (1990) argues that the length of the land
contract of the government with the farmer is about seven years, and this is too short to encourage the
farm household to invest optimally in improving the land and maximizing the productivity of all fixed and
variable inputs used in agriculture (Feder, et al. 1992).  Moreover, for farmers approaching the end of
their land contracts, the expectation that they will be assigned different land in the village within a few
years could sharply reduce their incentive to improve the productive potential of the land through
investments in drainage, fertilizers with persistent effects, and even weed control. Moreover, the contract
with the government for “use of the land” may be abrogated if the family neglects the land, and the capital
value of the contract for the land would be lost entirely if too many members of the household migrate. 
As a consequence, to keep control of the land, the farm household can only allow selected family
members to migrate in search of better employment, perhaps only during the slack season when
agricultural labor requirements are low.  As labor productivity in urban areas continues to increase,22
probably more rapidly than in agriculture, labor should be reallocated from agriculture to work in more
productive sectors of the economy.  However, the Chinese arrangements controlling property rights in
land prevent this from occurring in an efficient manner (Yang, 1997a).   Similar communal institutions
controlling property rights in land have in the past retarded the out migration of labor and capital during
industrialization, such as in Russia (e.g. Mir) and Mexico (ejidos).   Barriers to competitive land markets
prevent smaller agricultural units from being consolidated, when new technology increases the economies
of scale.  It also forecloses one of the few means the elderly have in agriculture to accumulate an asset
which could provide them with a means to support their consumption and health care needs in old age, as
previously noted.  Certainly, the lack of a market in land makes the importance of children, and sons in
particular, all the stronger in rural China, and may underlie the greater neglect and mortality of infant girls
than boys, and the use of ultra-sound diagnostic tests to abort selectively female fetuses in the rural areas
of China’s poorest provinces.  
Migration can also be viewed as an equilibrating mechanism to reduce inequality in wages. In most
populations, the probability of migration increases with the education of the individual (Schultz, 1988). This
may be explained by the ability of the more educated to assess the relevant risks and process the
information required to migrate at less cost than is possible for the less educated potential migrant. 
Migration may also be a human capital investment that is easier for relatively rich families to finance,
through borrowing against their other collareral resources.  It is common, therefore, to observe a larger
ratio of wages between educated and uneducated workers in the lower-income regions of a country, i.e.
greater returns to schooling. The relatively rich families in poor rural regions invest more in the
outmigration of their better- educated children to the high-wage urban labor markets than do the poor
families in these regions.5  The relatively rich families in a poor rural (origin) state will also tend to receive
more transfers from their family members who have migrated to the city, perhaps as a repayment for
family investments in their migration.  It should then be expected that private family transfers between
poorer and richer states, which are expected to be largely transfers related to migration, are not23
necessarily equalizing within the poor origin state.   Tsui (1993) finds private transfers within and between
the provinces of Sichuan and Guangdong increased inequality overall6. Gustafsson and Li (1997) also show
that private transfers between families increase inequality, flowing from rich households to other relatively
rich households, and not redistributing transfer income to ameliorate inequality.
However, this an easily misinterpreted assessment of migration’s total effect on inequality. The
flow of well-educated rural workers to urban areas clearly benefits the migrants who tend to come from
upper income families.  It also has an effect on the market equilibrium wage structure,  reducing the wages
of the educated in the city, which should unambiguously reduce overall inequality, as well as reduce
inequality within the high income urban destination regions.  Again, the effect on the sending region will be
to raise wages for the migrant class of educated workers, and this may be inequality-increasing in the poor
sending regions.  This effect on inequality within the origin region, however, is not likely to dominate the
other beneficial effects of migration on inequality.  The total effect of migration on inequality cannot be
ascertained from a static decomposition of the transfer income’s contribution to inequality, even if
somehow the investment costs to produce the migrant transfers were properly measured and deducted
from the transfers from urban to rural households or from richer to poorer areas.  Most of the gains from
migration are due to improvements in production efficiency, in other words, reducing the differences in
productivity of similar workers in different locations in an economy.  The efficiency gains are likely to
outweigh the mixed effects on family inequality which should be measured as a capitalized net flow, after
deducting the present value of investments costs.   The outmigration of more productive workers from a
low-wage market should not be misinterpreted as a social loss, because the private gain of the migrants
dominates the potential indirect effects on inequality in their origin communities?
How can public transfer income be targeted to the poor, those who may need this transfer because
they do not have a family support network on which to rely?  To the extent that the public transfer merely
displaces or “crowds out” private inter-household family transfers, the public transfer may not improve
overall income inequality.  It is reassuring that in both Tsui’s (1993) study of rural Sichuan and Guangdong24
from 1985-1990 and Gustafsson and Li’s (1997) study of ten provinces from 1987 and 1995, public
transfers are income equalizing, although the effect is small.  On the other hand, there is evidence from
Tsui that pension transfers from the state firms and collectives contribute to greater inequality, which
confirms the worry that rural industries strengthen the resource base of local governments in areas that
tend to be already relatively well-endowed.  Thus, the township-village-enterprises are not likely to equalize
incomes across regions in China by their transfers, but their productive contributions to efficient use of
resources and to aggregate growth may still be important.
3.4.   Income Sources and Health of the Elderly in Rural and Urban Areas
Table 1 reports from a 1992 Survey on China’s Support System for the Elderly conducted by the
China Research Center on Aging the level of individual income of persons age 60 or over. Elderly males in
urban areas have incomes that are about 2.5 times those in rural areas, and for women the income ratio is
2.6, although elderly women have only about half as much income as do men (Schultz and Yu, 1998c). 
The income of urban elderly is predominantly from public transfers, with pensions representing the largest
share, particularly for men.   Half of the income of elderly urban males is from pensions and another
quarter is from government and communities subsidies.  In contrast, the much poorer rural elderly receive
a fourth as much of their income from public transfers, and rely heavily on private transfers for a third of
rural male incomes and two-thirds of rural female incomes.  Also, the urban elderly earn less than a fourth
as much of their income as do the elderly in rural areas, whose extreme poverty could explain their
continued work (i.e. 9.0 versus 43.4 percent for urban and rural males, and 2.1 versus 21.7 percent for
urban and rural females as reported in Table 1).   This economically vulnerable elderly group is relatively
better protected by Chinese government welfare programs in the urban than rural areas7.  In contrast, the
much poorer rural elderly must often rely on private family support from their children.  I have earlier
argued that this group of poor rural elderly is  most adversely affected by the birth quota.  The next25
generation of elderly in the rural areas of China will be even more vulnerable, having fewer children to
support them, and few public pensions and deteriorating public health care (Ahmad and Hussain, 1989).
There are always ambiguities in estimating personal incomes when some goods and services are
produced and consumed by the household, and other services flow from durable assets, such as owner-
occupied housing or housing provided by an employer (Khan and Riskin, 1998).  Also, family composition
and the sharing of income and consumption is not always adequately measured in surveys.  One approach
to deal with these ambiguities of income measures and suitable adjustments of  household income for the
composition of households is derived from the work of Engel (1857), who observed that the share of food
in total expenditures of a household declined monotonically among Belgium workers as the level of income
increased.  Thomas (1986) has illustrated that this “Engel law” that the share of food expenditures declines
as income and welfare increases is also an empirical regularity in low-income countries today.   In the
elderly survey of China this food share tends to be higher for rural than urban men and women, and that
the food share for elderly women tends to be larger than for men, suggesting that women are poorer than
men in urban areas at all elderly ages, and women are poorer than men in rural areas for those 60-69 and
over age 80, and approximate parity in the 70's (Schultz and Yu, 1998c). 
Adult health status is difficult to measure in a self assessed survey, and one indicator that appears
to be replicable, and to predict well clinically confirmed good health, and to increase subjectively assessed
welfare of the elderly is their lack of physical limitations in preforming activities of daily living (ADL)
(Stewart and Ware, 1992; Strauss, et al., 1995).  Summing the answers to five questions on the
respondent’s capacity to perform for themselves five everyday activities, an ADL index of good health is
constructed which represents the absence of these limitations.  Regressing this health index on age,
education, and income  Table 2 summarizes the results.  Health declines for rural and urban men and
women with advancing age, whereas the better educated report  noticeably fewer limitations on their
physical activities of daily living .  The individual’s income is associated with improvements in this health
indicator for rural men and women, but has no added effect after education is held constant for urban men26
and women.  One interpretation is that the urban residents in China have access to free state-supported
medical services, and thus to the extent that these services improve their functioning, this health benefit is
enjoyed independent of their income. Conversely, in the rural areas collectivized medical institutions have
generally been closed after the agricultural reforms, and rural health services are likely to have been
privatized. Higher income elderly in rural areas are thus increasingly able to use more health care and
report improved health outcomes compared with the rural poor.  
4.      Conclusions
Household surveys indicate that the elderly in rural areas of China are much poorer and in poorer
health, than their urban counterparts, just as the wage levels in urban areas are on average two-and-a-half
times the level in rural areas.  The evidence of increasing returns to education that emerges from many
sources of data in China suggest that post-secondary schooling is becoming more productive in the 1990's
with the diffusion of economic reforms that increase the opportunity for workers to innovate and adopt
new technologies and search out their best employment prospects.  The financial decentralization of health
and education programs, however,  has created stronger inequalities among the elderly by income in the
rural population than in the urban population, and there is parallel evidence that widening differentials
according to income between their children’s schooling (Knight and Li, 1996).  If centralized government
resources are needed for human resource development in China today, they are specifically needed to
mitigate the growing inequality of human capital in the poor rural population.  Going forward priority should
be given to equalizing investment opportunities for children across future birth cohorts in China, which will
require subsidizing the poor rural areas to invest in improving schools and child health and nutrition
programs.  This is an area where the Chinese government made great progress in the first two decades of
the Peoples’ Republic.  It will be a challenge for the Central government to adequately support these
targeted human capital investment programs, which should shelter the young from the consequences of the
growing rural-urban economic disparities.  In the longer term, as agreements between China and the World27
Trade Organization reduce domestic protection from the relative prices of the world economy, the task will
be to help the rural poor leave the less productive areas of agriculture for the Township-Village-
Enterprises and to migrate to better jobs in urban areas. In the meanwhile, the rural elderly are likely to be
left behind, and to represent a salient poverty problem that China has made only worse by its past birth
quotas population policy.  The rural elderly have lost out in the increasingly vigorous private competition for 
income, and they have also lost out in the political competition for public provision of social services in old-
age support, health and education.28
Table 1
Income of the Elderly, By Sex and Region in 1992 and its Percentage Composition by Income Source*
Urban Rural
Men Women Men Women
 Total Income in Yuans,
including home production
2549. 1416. 1035 538.
           (Percent of Total):
Earned Income 9.0 2.1 43.4 21.7
Interest and Rents 2.5 4.5 1.6 1.4
Public Transfers:
     Pensions 49.9 27.9 7.1 0.5
     Government Subsidies 27.9 27.5 5.9 3.0
     Community Support 0.1 0.4 6.3 8.7
          Total Public Transfers (78.0) (55.7) (19.3) (12.2)
Private Transfers:
      From Children 7.8 33.6 32.5 61.0
      From other Relatives .5 1.3 2.3 3.2
           Total Private Transfer (8.3) (35.0) (34.8) (64.2)
Other Income Sources 2.2 2.6 0.9 0.5
Sample Size 4742 4933 4822 5372
* Derived from the survey on China’s Support System for the Elderly conducted by the China Research Center on
Aging. Elderly include those over age 59 on January 1, 1992. The survey is a stratified, nationally representative,
sample of all provinces and municipalities of China, and is self weighted according to the 1990 Census.
Source: Schultz and Yu 1998c, Table 2. 1 Defined as five items from the limitations of Activity of Daily Living (ADLs): unable to dress by oneself,
eat, bathe, go to bathroom, and go outside by oneself.  If “no difficulty” the score assigned to non-missing items is
10, if “some difficulty” item scored 5, if “complete difficulty” item is scored 0.  The sum of the scores is divided by
the number of non-missing items.  The index of health ranges from zero to ten.
2 Additional explanatory variables included in the ordinary least squares regression are whether the person
is of a minority (not Han) ethnic group, and the fertility.  Fertility was insignificant and minority was weakly negative
for urban male and positive for urban female and insignificant for rural residents of either gender. Beneath OLS
coefficients in parentheses are the absolute value of the t ratio.  See note of survey source in Table 1.
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Men Women Men Women
Age compared with  60-64
    65-69 -.171 -.161 -0.49 -.065
(3.33) (3.27) (1.25) (1.43)
    70-74 -.261 -.296 -.188 -.191
(4.60) (5.40) (4.21) (3.96)
    75-79 -.525 -.585 -.319 -.409
(7.53) (8.47) (5.91) (7.42)
    80-84 -.800 -1.35 -.549 -.718
(8.00) (15.1) (7.21) (10.1)
    85 or more -1.61 -2.26 -1.04 -1.57
(9.96) (17.9) (8.65) (15.9)
Education compared with 
    Primary .089 .005 .032 .100
(1.68) (0.12) (1.95) (1.36)
    Junior Middle .112 .084 .120 .014
(1.79) (1.18) (2.06) (0.07)
    Senior Middle .143 .149 .216 .112
(1.95) (1.62) (1.89) (0.24)
    College or more .192 .028 .601 —
(2.21) (0.25) (2.15) —
Household Income per capita .002 .003 .003 .006
     (Yuan x 10
3) (0.70) (1.00) (2.00) (2.51)
Mean of Health Index Variable 9.61 9.53 9.72 9.59
Source: Schultz and Yu 1998b, Table A-3.30
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1.  I do not know of social experiments which have assessed how the random provision of pensions to
young individuals has modified their lifetime fertility (Schultz, 1997).  Persons observed in a survey with
and without a pension tend to differ in many other ways, including perhaps their fertility goals, savings
behavior, risk aversion, and healthiness.  In particular, a person may have selected their job because they
had a specific interest in obtaining a job-related pension, or because they wanted to avoid the burden of
rearing children to support them in old age, or retire early.
2.  Anhui, Beijing, Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shanxi, and Yunnan are included
in 1988 and Sichuan is added in 1995, but excluded in this study to maintain comparability between the two
years.
3.  Collected by the Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
4.  This panel survey collected in 1989, 1991 and 1993 from rural and urban areas.  See Yan (1999).
5.  Brazil is a standard example of this pattern, where the Northeast is extremely poor compared with the
South, and yet the least educated are the last to migrate to the more prosperous regions of the country. 
As a result the pattern is for interstate wage relative differences to be larger for the least educated
workers, and to become more similar for the highly educated who are the most mobile workforce. 
Conversely, private wage returns are often smaller in the more developed, higher income states, such as
Sao Paulo, than in the low income Northeastern region.  The same pattern has been noted in China.
6.  This study is based on the rural survey team of the State Statistical Bureau survey for 1985, 1988,
and 1990 for these two provinces.
7.  It should be noted that the value of medical services received by the urban elderly do not appear to
be imputed a value and added to the income and expenditure accounts in the 1992 Survey of the
Elderly or counted in the government subsidies. Thus, the real income gap between rural and urban is
probably larger than reported in table 1.
     Endnotes: